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INTRODUCTION
In First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has em-
ployed two doctrines—state action and government speech—to de-
marcate the boundaries between the public and private spheres.
Under the state-action doctrine, a plaintiff claiming a free-speech in-
fringement must show some state action in order to trigger constitu-
tional protection; the constraints of the First Amendment apply not to
private persons but to the government.  But when the government it-
self speaks, it is not constrained by the Free Speech Clause, and it
need not represent all viewpoints equally.  The government-speech
doctrine is a defense the government raises when it is accused of vio-
† B.A., Yale College, 2009; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2014; Articles Editor,
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lating an individual’s freedom of speech or of viewpoint
discrimination.
After the birth of the state-action doctrine in the Civil Rights
Cases,1 the Supreme Court began to impose more and more constitu-
tional requirements on private action.  Thus, in Marsh v. Alabama,2 the
Court applied the First Amendment against a privately owned com-
pany town with no governmental connections whatsoever.3  But since
the apex of the state-action doctrine in Marsh, the Court has substan-
tially contracted its definition of state action, requiring greater gov-
ernment contacts to invoke constitutional protection.4  During this
same period, the government-speech doctrine has expanded to im-
pute more private speech to the government, thus removing its First
Amendment protection.  Accordingly, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Ass’n,5 the Court ruled that an advertising campaign funded entirely
by the beef industry was government speech.6  And in Pleasant Grove
City, Utah v. Summum,7 the Court held that a privately funded monu-
ment proposed to be constructed in a city park constituted govern-
ment speech as well.8  In those cases, the government was able to
insulate itself from claims of viewpoint discrimination by claiming ar-
guably private speech as its own.9  Although the state-action and gov-
ernment-speech doctrines serve different purposes, they have
achieved a singular result: the contraction of state action and the ex-
pansion of government speech together narrow the spectrum of pri-
vate, protected speech.
Underlying the Court’s government-speech decisions—which
employ different rhetoric and different standards from its state-action
decisions—is an assumption that government speech is not equivalent
to state action.  But if speech is rather understood as a form of action,
separate standards may not be necessary, and the two doctrines can be
combined or treated similarly.  Perhaps a singular test—such as a ra-
tional-observer test or an examination of government intent or gov-
ernment function—can reconcile the two doctrines.  But pitfalls
remain.  Despite conceptual similarities, courts employ the two doc-
trines to address very different constitutional problems; any singular
1 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
3 See id. at 509–10.
4 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (noting that even
extensive state regulation does not necessarily convert private action into state action for
the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment).
5 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
6 See id. at 553.
7 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
8 See id. at 481.
9 See Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 470–71; Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–62.
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standard may be so over- and underinclusive as to render it
ineffective.
This Note does not argue that the Rehnquist-Roberts Court’s use
of these doctrines to narrow the spectrum of private protected speech
is necessarily improper—I leave that debate to others.  Rather, it con-
siders whether reconciliation of the two doctrines would result in
more consistent and predictable rulings without undermining the
doctrines’ respective functions.  To that end, this Note examines
whether government speech is separate from or a form of state action
and, if it is a form of state action, whether courts can consistently ap-
ply one standard to both doctrines.
Part I recounts the historical development of the state-action and
government-speech doctrines, tracing how the modern decline of the
state-action doctrine has coincided with an expansion of the govern-
ment-speech doctrine.  Part II demonstrates how the two doctrines to-
gether narrow the spectrum of private, protected speech and
considers whether government speech is fully distinguishable from
state action.  Part III argues that government speech is a form of state
action and considers whether the doctrines can be applied consist-
ently by examining reasonable-observer, government-intent, and gov-
ernment-function tests.
I
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE-ACTION AND
GOVERNMENT-SPEECH DOCTRINES
A. The Rise and Fall of State Action
The Supreme Court enunciated the state-action doctrine shortly
after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby
greatly restricted Congress’s power to proscribe private racial discrimi-
nation.10  Under the doctrine, state action, as opposed to private ac-
tion, is necessary to trigger constitutional protection.11  Despite these
restrictive beginnings, however, the Court significantly expanded the
doctrine in the following decades to encompass many types of private
action, so long as that private action involves sufficient government
contacts or a usurpation of a government function.12  But since its
apex in Marsh v. Alabama, the doctrine has contracted sharply.  Under
the modern state-action doctrine, the Court has revived the public/
10 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11 Id. at 17 (“The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any [state] authority,
is simply a private wrong . . . .”).
12 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (holding that a
privately-owned town had assumed a governmental function and was thus subject to the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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private distinction of the Civil Rights Cases, requiring greater govern-
ment contact before constitutional protection may be invoked.13
In 1883 the Supreme Court first delineated the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment, clarifying against which actors the first section of
the Amendment applies.  In five cases, decided together and now
known as the Civil Rights Cases, the Court first laid the foundation of
the state-action doctrine.14  These cases established that purely private
action is not the province of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Rather, the
Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action.  Writing for the
majority, Justice Joseph Bradley enunciated the first statement of the
doctrine:
 It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited.  Indi-
vidual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
[A]mendment.  It has a deeper and broader scope.  It nullifies and
makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind,
which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal
protection of the laws.15
Relying upon a formalistic distinction between public and private
action, the doctrine greatly curtailed the federal government’s ability
to regulate private racial discrimination, despite indications that the
framers of the amendment likely intended to grant Congress power to
guard against discrimination, regardless of its source.16  Thus, in the
Civil Rights Cases, the Court struck down portions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875,17 which prohibited private racial discrimination on public
conveyances, in inns, and in theaters and other places of public
amusement.18
Notwithstanding the majority opinion in the Civil Rights Cases,
later applications of the state-action doctrine are grounded in Justice
13 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (limiting state ac-
tion to “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State”).
14 But see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1875) (discussing
state-action principles prior to the doctrine’s elaboration in the Civil Rights Cases).
15 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
16 See HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 210–11
(1908); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of
the Laws,” 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 162–66 (1950); Richard F. Watt & Richard M. Orlikoff,
The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ILL. L. REV. 13, 31–33 (1949); see also Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74–87 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (outlining the historical
origins of the Fourteenth Amendment), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).  The best proof that the framers intended to grant Congress power to regulate
private discrimination is found in various civil rights acts passed contemporaneously with
the Fourteenth Amendment.
17 Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
18 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25–26.
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John Marshall Harlan’s dissent.19  Although Justice Harlan did not
concede that state action is a prerequisite under the Fourteenth
Amendment,20 he argued that even if state action were required, that
burden had been met in these cases.21  In the case of the railroads,
Justice Harlan stressed the role of the railroads in fulfilling an impor-
tant state function, arguing that the high degree of government con-
trol of the industry constituted state action.22  He treated inns
similarly under the common-law obligations of innkeepers.23  Finally,
in the case of the theater, Justice Harlan found government action in
the grant of power afforded by state licenses.24
Over the following decades, courts incorporated the reasoning of
Justice Harlan’s dissent into the state-action doctrine, recognizing that
state action could be implicated in private activities in many ways: by
granting power,25 allocating aid,26 creating monopolies,27 granting
protected status,28 influencing private persons to accomplish govern-
ment objectives,29 or judicially enforcing private rights.30
19 See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. R
20 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 49–50 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (reasoning that
because freedom from racial discrimination in public accommodations is an attribute of
United States citizenship, Congress can enact legislation to protect that right regardless of
the source of discrimination).
21 Id. at 57–59.
22 See id. at 37–40.
23 See id. at 40–41.
24 See id. at 41–42.
25 See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 85 (1932) (“Whatever power of exclusion has
been exercised by the members of the committee has come to them . . . as the delegates of
the State. . . .  If the State had not conferred [the power], there would be hardly color of
right to give a basis for its exercise.”).
26 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (requiring that
for government aid to constitute state action, the state must become involved in the private
activity “to some significant extent”); cf. Grossner v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp.
535, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding general aid to a university to be insufficiently related to
challenged disciplinary procedures to constitute state action).
27 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (considering state-sanc-
tioned monopoly power a relevant factor in determining whether state action has occurred
but finding that in this case—a partial monopoly—there had been no state action). But see
Particular Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1972)
(rejecting the state-created monopoly theory).
28 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 377, 380–81 (1967) (holding that a state con-
stitutional amendment guaranteeing a private right to discriminate constitutes state action
and overturning the amendment).
29 See Coleman v. Wagner Coll., 429 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., con-
curring) (“[I]f the state wishes the benefits of such deterrence in private colleges, must it
not accept responsibility for preventing overdeterrence by excessive sanctions and lack of
fair procedure for enforcement?”).
30 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (“State action . . . refers to exertions of
state power in all forms. . . .  We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the restric-
tive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection of
the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand.”).
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The state-action doctrine reached its zenith in Marsh v. Alabama.
In Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness distributed religious tracts in a small
company town without obtaining a permit from the corporation that
owned and operated the town.31  The question as articulated by the
Court was whether “the mere fact that all the property interests in the
town are held by a single company . . . give[s] that company power,
enforceable by a state statute, to abridge these freedoms.”32  The
Court held that it did not and reversed Marsh’s conviction, reasoning
that “[s]ince these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit
the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it
is subject to state regulation.”33  Thus, the Marsh Court defined state
action not by the extent of the government’s actions—which were
nonexistent in Marsh—but by the nature of the function in question.
It did not matter that the conduct in question was committed entirely
by private actors; no actual state action of any kind was required.
Many contemporary scholars heralded Marsh’s expansion of the
state-action doctrine, championing continued application of constitu-
tional limitations to other nonstate entities, such as private individuals
and corporations.34  Adolf Berle advocated comprehensive applica-
tion of the state-action doctrine to corporations based not on public
function but on the grant of power inherent in the corporate form.35
31 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502–04 (1946).  The town, Chickasaw, a suburb of
Mobile, Alabama, was owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Id. at 502.  The com-
pany owned all of the town’s public spaces, including its roads and sidewalks, and it em-
ployed a deputy of Mobile to serve as its policeman. Id.  Despite these characteristics, “the
town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general and
there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the
fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.” Id. at 503.
32 Id. at 505.
33 Id. at 506.  The Court’s reasoning recalls Justice Harlan’s argument in favor of ap-
plying the Fourteenth Amendment to railroads in his dissenting opinion in the Civil Rights
Cases. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 37–40 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34 See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against
Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 627, 627–29 (1946) (discussing
cases in which the Court found that private individual action violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, reasoning that state legislation applied to such action and noting that the
private discriminatory action would have been permissible but for the existence of the state
legislation); Harold W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for “State Action” Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 209 (1957) (“[W]henever, and however, a state gives
legal consequences to transactions between private persons there is ‘state action’ . . . .”);
J.D. Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. REV. 555, 555–56 (1951)
(discussing whether the Fourteenth Amendment reaches to protect personal rights against
infringement by an entity other than the state); John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise
of the “State Action” Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 855 (1966)
(arguing that the Supreme Court would likely extend the Fourteenth Amendment’s reach
beyond state action in response to the sit-in movement); William W. Van Alstyne & Ken-
neth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 3–5 (1961) (discussing the state-action limita-
tion with respect to race cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment).
35 See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of
Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 950 (1952).
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He argued that the doctrine requires a grant of government power
and sufficient economic power in order to trigger constitutional pro-
tection.36  For Berle, the corporate form itself constituted a sufficient
grant of government power.37  Since the privilege of incorporation is
granted by the state,38 Berle inferred that “state action in granting a
corporate charter assumes that the corporation will not exercise its
power (granted in theory at least to forward a state purpose) in a man-
ner forbidden the state itself.”39  Once the state grants the power of
incorporation, Berle would look to market concentration and eco-
nomic power.40  Thus, if a corporation exercises monopoly or oligop-
oly control over the market, “denial of [its] service[s] would be denial
of equal protection of the laws.”41
Jessie Choper advocated a similar power-centric theory, arguing
that “conduct of a private individual or organization that has a wide-
spread and fundamental impact on other private individuals should
be held to the obligations that the Constitution imposes on the
state.”42  Choper based his argument at least in part on institutional,
societal, and technological changes that subject personal liberties—
once vulnerable only to government intrusion—to private determina-
tion.43  Unlike Berle, who focused on market concentration and eco-
nomic power, Choper focused on the power of private actors to
fundamentally impact an individual’s rights.44
Although the courts have not adopted Berle’s or Choper’s expan-
sive power theories of state action, the open-ended public-function ex-
ception pronounced in Marsh had the potential for continued
expansion.  Justice William Douglas articulated what is perhaps the
loosest expression of the doctrine in Evans v. Newton,45 finding state
action implicated in powers or functions that are merely “governmen-
tal in nature.”46  But the public-function exception receded from the
36 See id. at 950–51.
37 Berle’s reasoning recalls Justice Harlan’s treatment of theaters and other places of
public amusement in his dissenting opinion in the Civil Rights Cases. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 41–42.
38 See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing in part) (“Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld is always a
matter of state policy.  If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to achieve an end
which the State deems desirable.”).
39 Berle, supra note 35, at 952. R
40 See id. at 952–55.
41 Id. at 952.
42 Jessie H. Choper, Commentary, Thoughts on State Action: The “Government Function”
and “Power Theory” Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 757, 777.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
46 Id. at 296.
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high water mark of Evans in the subsequent decade.47  In Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.,48 then-Justice William Rehnquist reaffirmed
the Civil Rights Cases’ formalist construction of the state-action doc-
trine as drawing a bright line between public and private action and
significantly contracted the public-function exception to apply only
when a private person exercises “powers traditionally exclusively re-
served to the State.”49  This new standard is strikingly strict.  Police,
firefighters, park rangers, and school officials all provide public ser-
vices, but none of them fulfill a traditionally exclusively government
function.  Indeed, throughout the history of the United States, most
public functions have been fulfilled through a combination of govern-
ment and private action.50
Since Jackson, the Court has maintained the formalist distinction
between public and private action.51  For example, in United States v.
Morrison,52 Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized “the enduring vitality
of the Civil Rights Cases”53 and determined that the statute at issue54
was “directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who
have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias,”55 despite evi-
dence that the statute was meant to address and would help to remedy
47 For example, Justice Hugo Black explained the Marsh Court’s holding in Amalga-
mated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. on different terms than mere
public function, emphasizing that Chickasaw had all the attributes of a town:
I think it is fair to say that the basis on which the Marsh decision rested was
that the property involved encompassed an area that for all practical pur-
poses had been turned into a town; the area had all the attributes of a town
and was exactly like any other town in Alabama.
391 U.S. 308, 331 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), abrogated by Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
48 419 U.S. 345 (1974).  In Jackson, a customer sued Metropolitan Edison Co., a pri-
vately owned and operated utility corporation, seeking damages under the Civil Rights Act
for terminating her electric service before she was afforded notice, a hearing, and an op-
portunity to pay any amounts found due. See id. at 346–47.  The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of state action; both the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court af-
firmed.  Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 348 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff’d, 483 F.2d 754
(3d Cir. 1973), aff’d, 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
49 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
50 See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938) (Black, J., concurring) (“There
is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of demarcation between essential and
non-essential governmental functions.  Many governmental functions of today have at
some time in the past been non-governmental.”).
51 See Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1248, 1251 (2010).
52 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
53 Id. at 624.
54 In question was the civil-remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)), invali-
dated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  The Court struck down the provi-
sion, holding that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment granted
Congress the authority to enact the provision. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
55 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
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disparate treatment on the basis of gender by state officials.56  Thus,
the modern state-action doctrine at once forces the courts to draw a
bright line between public and private action and very narrowly de-
fines what constitutes public action.  This narrow definition of public
action has resulted in an expansion of what the Court deems purely
private activity—activity that is not subject to constitutional regulation.
Taken together, the various threads of the state-action doctrine
form a patchwork of rules but no consistent standard. Jackson and
Morrison both concerned situations where the government had not ac-
tually acted.  (The purported “state actors” in those cases were, respec-
tively, a privately owned utilities company57 and an individual who
committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.58)  Those cases re-
quired a traditionally exclusively governmental function but supplied
no standard for determining which functions are traditionally exclu-
sively governmental.
Where the state has allegedly acted, it is also unclear which stan-
dard applies.  Earlier cases required that the state become “involved”
in a private activity “to some significant extent” for state action to be
found.59  Post-Morrison, the Court has looked at the pervasiveness of
public “entwinement” with the private actor.60  In Brentwood Academy v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, the state school board and pub-
lic schools were so pervasively entwined in the management of a pri-
vate, not-for-profit organization that regulated interscholastic sport
competition among public and private schools that the organization
essentially ceased to be a private actor.61  In that case, the Court found
state action.62  But where the government’s entwinement concerns
money, resources, or other forms of aid—rather than managerial con-
trol—it is much less clear how that standard is to apply.63
This lack of clarity is a function of the doctrine’s convoluted de-
velopment.  Because the state-action doctrine expanded in the
mid-twentieth century before contracting under the Rehnquist Court,
56 Id. at 619–20.
57 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
58 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
59 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
60 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298–302
(2001).
61 See id. Brentwood’s entwinement test recalls the third prong of the Lemon test, which
requires that government actions not excessively entangle the government with religion.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
62 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291.
63 Compare id. at 303 (noting that encouragement is “like ‘entwinement’ in referring
to kinds of facts that can justify characterizing an ostensibly private action as public in-
stead” but going on to say that “no one criterion must necessarily be applied”), with Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (holding that the Government can “merely chose[ ] to
fund one activity to the exclusion of [an] other”).
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the doctrine encompasses a rich body of jurisprudence but no clear
standards.
B. The Expansion of Government Speech
Whereas the state-action doctrine is fundamental Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence and has long been applied to other consti-
tutional protections, the government-speech doctrine first gained
prominence in the 1990s.64  The core principle of the doctrine is that
when the government speaks, its speech is not constrained by the Free
Speech Clause’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality but by the Estab-
lishment Clause.65  So long as it does not run afoul of the Establish-
ment Clause, the government can speak as it pleases.  And it can also
choose not to speak.  This is a fundamental function of government:
“[t]o govern, government has to say something,”66 but it cannot say
everything.  Thus, the government may encourage recycling, call for
war, or champion universal healthcare—but it need not simultane-
ously advocate contrary positions.
In the realm of free speech, the government-speech doctrine is
closely related to the state-action doctrine: the state-action doctrine is
concerned with the identity of the actor; the government-speech doc-
trine is concerned with the identity of the speaker.  But whereas indi-
viduals claiming a violation of their constitutional rights must show
state action, government speech is a defense the government raises
when it is accused of a Free Speech violation.
The 1991 Rust v. Sullivan67 decision is now widely regarded as the
first government-speech case.68  In Rust, doctors challenged a regula-
tion barring recipients of funds under Title X of the Public Health
Service Act69 from discussing abortion with their patients.70  The Su-
preme Court upheld the regulation, reasoning that the government
had “merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other.”71  Although the term government speech is not explicitly
mentioned in the opinion, Rust’s logic tracks that of later
64 See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. 173.
65 See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 460–61 (2009).
66 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
67 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
68 But see infra text accompanying notes 107–23 (tracing the government-speech doc- R
trine to earlier school-speech cases).
69 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (2006).
70 Rust, 500 U.S. at 177–78.
71 Id. at 193.
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government-speech cases,72 and the Court has since explained that
the doctrine underlies its holding in Rust.73
If one accepts that the government activity in Rust is in fact
speech, there is little doubt that the government is doing the speak-
ing.74  But difficulties arise when private individuals and the govern-
ment speak in concert or when the government aids private speech or
vice versa.75  As one circuit court has recognized, “[n]o clear standard
has yet been enunciated . . . for determining when the government”—
as opposed to a private person—“is ‘speaking.’”76
The Supreme Court’s decision in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Sum-
mum77 is the most recent articulation of the government-speech doc-
trine.  In Pleasant Grove, practitioners of a small religious sect known as
Summum sought an injunction to compel Pleasant Grove City to in-
stall a privately funded monument in a public park.78  The park in
question is a 2.5-acre municipal park located in the Historic District of
Pleasant Grove City, Utah.79  The park contains fifteen permanent dis-
plays, including “a historic granary, a wishing well, the City’s first fire
station, a September 11 monument, and a Ten Commandments mon-
ument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in 1971.”80  At least
eleven of the displays were privately donated.81  On several separate
occasions, the president of Summum requested permission to erect a
“‘stone monument,’ which would contain ‘the Seven Aphorisms of
72 Cf. id. (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at
the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in
another way.”).
73 See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court
in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the
doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding
in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this understanding.”).
74 Although the doctors in Rust were the speakers, they were speaking on behalf of
the government.  The Court held that because they received funds from the government,
their speech could be limited during their employ. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198–99; see also
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“When the
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it
may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor
distorted by the grantee.”).
75 Caroline Corbin has suggested that such cases should be deemed “mixed speech,”
subject to intermediate scrutiny. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is
Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008).  One circuit has recognized the
idea of mixed speech, but it has not found widespread recognition. See Planned
Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1119
(2005).
76 Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288
F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002).
77 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
78 See id. at 464.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 465.
81 Id.
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SUMMUM’ and be similar in size and nature to the Ten Command-
ments monument.”82  The city denied the requests, stating that the
park is limited to monuments that “either (1) directly relate to the
history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with long-
standing ties to the Pleasant Grove community.”83  Summum sued the
city, claiming that it had violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause by allowing the Ten Commandments monument but rejecting
Summum’s Seven Aphorisms monument.84  The district court dis-
missed Summum’s motion for a preliminary injunction, but the Tenth
Circuit reversed, holding that the resolution was a content-based re-
striction on free speech and was not narrowly tailored to meet the
city’s stated interests.85
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the city’s decision to
accept certain privately donated monuments while rejecting Sum-
mum’s was an exercise of government speech.86  Writing for a unani-
mous Court, Justice Samuel Alito reaffirmed that the government “is
entitled to say what it wishes, and to select the views that it wants to
express.”87  But the Court also recognized that the government does
not have absolute freedom to regulate private speech on government
property.88  Thus, the question before the Court was whether the city
was engaging in its own expressive conduct or providing a public fo-
rum for private speech.
Although Justice Alito recognized that there are some situations
when it is difficult to tell whether the government is speaking for itself
or providing a forum for private speech, he had no trouble catego-
rizing the situation at hand as government speech.89  First, the Court
held that the acceptance of a privately funded or donated monument
constitutes an expressive act because such monuments are meant to
82 Id. (footnote omitted).  For the full text of the Seven Aphorisms, see Seven Summum
Principles, SUMMUM, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtml (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013).
83 Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 465.  The city formalized the policy in a resolution after
Summum made two such requests; the resolution also included other criteria, such as
safety and esthetics. Id.
84 Id. at 466.
85 Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1054 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 555
U.S. 460 (2009).
86 Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 481.
87 Id. at 467–68 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88 Id. at 469–70 (“Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are allowed [in
traditional public fora], but any restriction based on the content of the speech must satisfy
strict scrutiny, . . . and restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited.” (citations omitted)).
89 Id. at 470 (“There may be situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a govern-
ment entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech, but
this case does not present such a situation.”).  But the fact that the Court overturned a
split-panel decision that was denied an en banc rehearing by an equal vote suggests other-
wise. See Summum, 499 F.3d at 1171.
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convey90 and have the effect of conveying91 a government message.
Next, the Court addressed Summum’s argument that the monument
only constitutes government speech if the city takes “control over the
message.”92  According to Summum, this control could be achieved
during the planning stage by helping to craft the message or after the
display has been created through formal resolution.93  The Court dis-
missed such requirements because these monuments do not evoke
one discrete message that can be adopted or not; rather, they are in-
herently open to various subjective and mutable interpretations.94
Lastly, although the Court recognized that the park is a public forum,
it drew a clear distinction between speech activities such as proselytiz-
ing, distributing leaflets, or public demonstrations—all of which are
ephemeral in nature—and erecting permanent monuments.95  Thus,
the Court determined that the park is not a public forum in this
context.96
The concurring opinions of Justices John Paul Stevens,97 Stephen
Breyer,98 and David Souter99 attempted to distance the Court as much
as possible from the government-speech doctrine.  Justice Stevens de-
scribed the government-speech doctrine as “recently minted” and its
precedent as being “of doubtful merit.”100  But his alternative, con-
struing the acceptance of the monument as an implicit endorsement
of the donor’s message, seems merely to restate the
government-speech doctrine: the government can choose not to en-
dorse the donor’s message precisely because the government can dis-
criminate between various messages when it speaks.  Justice Breyer
shied from rote categorization of the city’s denial of Summum’s re-
quest as government speech and would instead have “ask[ed] whether
a government action burdens speech disproportionately in light of the
action’s tendency to further a legitimate government objective.”101
Applying this standard, Justice Breyer concluded that the city’s action
was not a disproportionate restriction on Summum’s freedom of ex-
90 Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 470 (“When a government entity arranges for the con-
struction of a monument, it does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill
some feeling in those who see the structure.”).
91 See id. at 472 (“Public parks are often closely identified in the public mind with the
government unit that owns the land.”).
92 See Brief for Respondent at 33–34, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S.
460 (2009) (No. 07-665).
93 Id.
94 Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 473–78.
95 See id. at 479.
96 See id. at 478–80.
97 Id. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 484 (Breyer, J., concurring).
99 Id. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
100 Id. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101 Id. at 484 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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pression and therefore did not violate the First Amendment.102  But
this reasoning seems to concede that Summum has a Free Speech in-
terest while inexplicably not applying heightened scrutiny.  Justice
Souter, concurring only in the judgment, argued that the Court
should have “ask[ed] whether a reasonable and fully informed ob-
server would understand the expression to be government speech, as
distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige.”103
But Pleasant Grove did not adopt Justice Souter’s rational-observer
test.  Instead, the government-speech doctrine has retained the for-
malist private/public distinction and remains without a clearly articu-
lated standard.  Despite this lack of a clear standard, the doctrine
clearly imputes more private and quasi-private conduct to the govern-
ment than the state-action doctrine does.  Thus, the government-
speech doctrine enables the government to subsume certain forms of
private speech in order to immunize itself from claims of Free Speech
violations.
II
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE ACTION AND
GOVERNMENT SPEECH
A. Rhetorical Tension, Functional Cohesion
The interaction of the state-action and government-speech doc-
trines has resulted in a strange incongruity: the Court declines to ex-
tend First Amendment protection to speech that is censored by a
third party by claiming that there has been no state action, yet it in-
vokes a seemingly opposite rationale—claiming that certain private
speech is in fact government speech—to deny, once again, First
Amendment protection.  But despite these seeming rhetorical incon-
sistencies, the state-action and government-speech doctrines converge
in their result: the contraction of state action and the expansion of
government speech narrow the spectrum of private protected speech.
But the two doctrines do not necessarily operate on the same
playing field because they address different problems.  The state-ac-
tion doctrine requires a certain amount of state action to trigger con-
stitutional protection because purely private conduct is not subject to
the constraints of the First Amendment.  Thus, state-action analysis
concerns the extent of the state’s involvement, support, influence, aid,
102 See id.
103 Id. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Johanns v. Livestock
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 578–79 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Unless the putative
government speech appears to be coming from the government, its governmental origin
cannot possibly justify the burden on the First Amendment interests of the dissenters
targeted to pay for it.”).  The merits of Justice Souter’s rational-observer standard are dis-
cussed infra Part III.A.
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and grant of power, inter alia, in a constitutional infringement.  In the
context of the First Amendment, this could take the form of the gov-
ernment compelling a third party to censor protected speech.  The
government-speech doctrine, on the other hand, is concerned with
the identity of the speaker.  If the government is deemed to be the
speaker, there is no First Amendment protection because the govern-
ment may speak as it pleases, constrained not by viewpoint neutral-
ity—as when the government censors speech through state action—
but by the Establishment Clause.104  Thus, a private monument may
be considered government speech if it is erected in a city park.
The Court’s language places the doctrines on two different spec-
trums: action and speech.  Consider a continuum ranging from purely
private action to no private action (i.e., purely government action).
The decline of the state-action doctrine has effectively extended the
range of private action—which is not constrained by the First Amend-
ment—requiring stronger government action in order to trigger con-
stitutional protection.  On an analogous continuum ranging from
purely private speech to no private speech (i.e., purely government
speech), the rise of the government-speech doctrine has expanded
what constitutes government speech, thereby limiting what speech is
private speech and thus protected by the First Amendment.
Although the two doctrines operate across different spectrums,
these spectrums relate to each other in their effect upon private
speech.  Together, these two doctrines narrow the scope of private,
protected speech: the contraction of the state-action doctrine has lim-
ited protected speech on one end by narrowing what is considered
government action, while the government-speech doctrine has limited
protected speech on the other end by expanding what is considered
government speech.
The Court seems to want to have it both ways; it is at once a
state-action minimalist and a government-speech maximalist.  Implicit
in this reasoning—indeed the only way to maintain these seemingly
contradictory positions—is the presupposition that government
speech is not state action.  Underlying that presupposition is the pri-
vate/public dichotomy.  Thus, the Court relies on formalist, bright-
line distinctions between state action and government speech and be-
tween public and private conduct to achieve a cohesive functionalist—
or perhaps consequence-driven—result, viz., limiting the scope of the
First Amendment’s protection of private speech.
This result is not necessarily undesirable.  But because neither
the state-action doctrine nor the government-speech doctrine has
104 See Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 468 (“This does not mean that there are no restraints
on government speech.  For example, government speech must comport with the Estab-
lishment Clause.”).
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clearly articulated standards, the reasoning that the Court has em-
ployed to reach that result has produced inconsistent and unpredict-
able rulings.
B. Is Government Speech State Action?
Although the Court’s decisions implicitly distinguish between
government speech and state action, it is unclear whether this distinc-
tion is necessary—or even internally consistent.  Reconciliation of the
state-action and government-speech doctrines could resolve the in-
consistency and unpredictability produced by the lack of clear
standards.
Any attempt to reconcile the two doctrines first requires a defini-
tion of both state action and government speech.  Defining state ac-
tion noncircularly presents a challenge: What is state action but the
acts of the state?  State action is not defined by the Court; it is a basic
idea—a fundamental concept—underlying the Court’s jurisprudence.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the cornerstone of the Court’s
state-action doctrine, lawmaking and law enforcement are clearly state
action.105  But the Court’s state-action decisions do not so much de-
fine state action as distinguish it from private action.106  State action is
thus defined negatively; it is the acts of the state that are not the acts
of private individuals.  Yet although the crux of the doctrine is the
public/private distinction, the state-action decisions do give examples
of what sorts of activities constitute state action.  Together, these cases
provide a broad picture of state action: the government legislates, reg-
ulates, and taxes; it may enforce the law through police or judicial
action; it can also incentivize or subsidize certain activities.  Thus, state
action is how the government governs.  It is the means by which the
government accomplishes its normative goals.
Is government speech conceptually or functionally separable
from this definition?  The First Amendment does not grant the gov-
ernment freedom of speech; rather, it restricts government regulation
of private speech.107  Thus, the government-speech doctrine is not
grounded in the First Amendment, and it need not be.  Unlike private
105 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (beginning its list of prohibitions with the phrase:
“No State shall make or enforce any law . . . .”); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
11 (1883) (considering legislation to be state action).
106 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17 (“[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by
the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of
individuals . . . .”).
107 Cf. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 467 (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government
regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.”); Johanns, 544 U.S.
at 553 (“[T]he Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scru-
tiny.”); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“Government is not restrained by the First Amendment from
controlling its own expression.” (citation omitted)).
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speech, government speech is not valuable qua speech.  Rather, the
Court has based its justification for the government-speech doctrine
on the fact that the government’s ability to speak—to favor one view-
point at the expense of another—is a fundamental necessity of gov-
erning.108  The government uses speech to promote its policies.109
Here, state action and government speech converge.  Both are
fundamental to governing; both advance the government’s goals.  But
they are not equivalent or fully interchangeable: not every state action
is government speech.  Rather, government speech is one of the
means that the government can employ to achieve a desired policy.
Government speech is a form of state action.110  Take, for example,
the problem of obesity.  If the government’s goal is to fight obesity, it
has various means at its disposal: It can regulate the size of soft drinks,
require restaurants to display nutritional information, tax junk foods,
or subsidize healthy foods.  It can also broadcast television commer-
cials or sponsor websites that encourage healthy diet and lifestyle
choices.  The latter options are not valuable to the government in a
First Amendment sense, that is, because they are speech.  Rather, as a
form of state action, government speech is valuable because it ad-
vances the government’s policy goals.
108 See, e.g., Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“To govern, government
has to say something . . . .”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is the very business of government to
favor and disfavor points of view . . . .”).
109 Helen Norton points to public-awareness campaigns as one example of govern-
ment speech facilitating First Amendment interests, such as sharing knowledge and discov-
ering truth. See Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 589–90 (2008).  But it is not the speech nature of those cam-
paigns that makes them valuable.  It is the ability of that speech to influence the public.
Government speech’s ability to “facilitate” First Amendment interests is only valuable if it
results in the achievement of desired policy goals.  Facilitation of First Amendment inter-
ests may be a happy side effect of government speech, but it is not a necessary result.
Government speech often undermines First Amendment values: the inherent and poten-
tially overwhelming power of government speech—rooted in the power of the state—can
distort the marketplace of ideas, undermine democratic legitimacy, repress individual au-
tonomy, and suppress dissent. Cf., e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Foreword to EXTREME SPEECH AND
DEMOCRACY, at v, v–ix (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009) (democratic legitimacy);
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
26–27 (1965) (self-government); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 89–90 (David Bromwich
& George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859) (marketplace of ideas); STEVEN H.
SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA, at xi (1999) (dissent); C. Ed-
win Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997) (autonomy and
self-disclosure).  Indeed, government speech is at best irrelevant, if not antagonistic, to
First Amendment values such as autonomy, self-disclosure, and dissent.  But government
speech does not lose its value when it frustrates First Amendment values.  Whether facilitat-
ing or undermining those values, government speech remains independently valuable as a
means by which the government achieves its normative goals.
110 See Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1285 (2011) (“[G]overnments must be permitted to speak
freely because government speech is often a form of government action.”).
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III
TOWARD A CONSISTENT STATE-ACTION STANDARD
If government speech is a form of state action, why do the courts
apply different standards when determining what action constitutes
state action and what speech constitutes government speech?  One
reason could be that the two doctrines address different sets of
problems.  The state-action doctrine is a response to constitutional vi-
olations committed by private actors.  It protects private victims from
the acts of private actors by imposing limitations normally applied
only to the government upon those actors.  The government-speech
doctrine, on the other hand, is not applied to protect private citizens.
Rather, it protects the government from allegations of free-speech vio-
lations by construing arguably private expressive acts as government
speech.  Thus, the state-action doctrine applies the constitutional limi-
tations of the state to private actors while the government-speech doc-
trine releases the state from the restraints of the First Amendment.
Although these two doctrines converge in their effect—both narrow
the spectrum of private protected speech—perhaps the issues that the
two doctrines address are too distinct for one standard to apply.
Despite the differences between the two doctrines and the
problems that they seek to address, the following subparts apply sev-
eral different standards to both doctrines in an attempt to determine
whether a consistent standard could be effective.
A. Reasonable Observer
One such standard is found in Justice Souter’s concurrence in
Pleasant Grove.111  Concurring only in the judgment, Justice Souter ar-
gued that instead of creating a per se rule that monuments on public
land are government speech, the Court should ask if a “reasonable
and fully informed observer” would see the challenged speech as be-
ing government speech rather than private speech that the govern-
ment has voluntarily accommodated.112  Unlike the majority
111 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 487 (2009) (Souter, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
112 Id.; see also Johanns, 544 U.S. 550, 578–79 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Unless
the putative government speech appears to be coming from the government, its govern-
mental origin cannot possibly justify the burden on the First Amendment interests of the
dissenters targeted to pay for it.”).  In Johanns, the Court considered an advertising cam-
paign funded entirely by an excise tax on the beef industry to be government speech.  The
advertising campaign in question promoted the “consumption of beef and beef products,
using funds raised by an assessment on cattle sales and importation.” Id. at 553 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  Respondents, cattle ranchers and other members of the beef
industry, claimed that the campaign violated their First Amendment rights because it
amounted to a compelled subsidy of speech (while the ranchers did not protest the promo-
tion of beef consumption, they objected that the advertisements did not differentiate be-
tween grades of beef). See id. at 556.  The Court held that the assessment was constitutional
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opinion—and the rest of the government-speech decisions113—Justice
Souter’s concurrence proposes a clear and simple standard for deter-
mining which speech constitutes government speech.  This standard
would reduce the government-speech inquiry to one question: Would
a reasonable observer attribute the speech to the government?  Not
only would such a standard be easier to administer,114 the test also
moves away from unwieldy, formalist distinctions between public and
private speech.  Furthermore, an observer test reinforces democratic
values: only if the public is aware that the government is speaking can
it hold the government accountable for its speech.115
Justice Souter’s reasonable-observer test is not new; it was first
used to determine what speech could be considered school-sponsored
speech.  Although the Court has traced the roots of the
government-speech doctrine to Rust, it previously applied similar rea-
soning in the context of student speech in public schools.116  In Hazel-
wood School District v. Kuhlmeier,117 the Court upheld a public school’s
decision to censor student articles published in a student-edited
school newspaper because public schools may exercise editorial con-
trol over school-sponsored speech.118  Just as the government may
speak as it pleases under the government-speech doctrine, public
schools have a similar prerogative to oversee school curricula and pro-
tect students from inappropriate material.119  Foreshadowing Justice
Souter’s reasonable-observer test by two decades, the Hazelwood Court
defined school-sponsored speech as any “expressive activities that stu-
dents, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
as government speech. See id. at 566–67.  Justice Souter dissented because there was little
to no indication to the public that the advertisements were government run. See id. at
578–79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
113 See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,
288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002) (“No clear standard has yet been enunciated . . . for
determining when the government is ‘speaking’ . . . .”).
114 Courts have long applied similar reasonable-person standards in other areas of law,
such as torts; furthermore, Justice Souter’s reasonable-observer test “is of a piece with the
one for spotting forbidden governmental endorsement of religion in the Establishment
Clause cases.” Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
115 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 575, 578–79 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Democ-
racy . . . ensures that government is not untouchable when its speech rubs against the First
Amendment interests of those who object to supporting it; if enough voters disagree with
what government says, the next election will cancel the message.”).
116 Although the First Amendment rights of students in public schools “are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,” Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986), and must be “applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment,” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969), the Court has consistently reaffirmed that students do not “shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Id.
117 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
118 Id. at 273.
119 See id. at 271–72.
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to bear the imprimatur of the school.”120  Assuming that public school
speech is a form of government speech, the reasonable-observer test
may be the first standard the Court articulated for determining when
the government is speaking.
Although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has confined the
reasonable-observer test to Justice Souter’s dissents, a recent area of
government-speech contention—specialty license plates—has proven
an apt testing ground for this approach.  The specialty-license-plate
cases generally involve a state producing license plates with a particu-
lar viewpoint without representing the alternative view.121  The ques-
tion is whether the specialty license plates represent government
speech or private speech.  If they represent private speech, then pro-
ducing, for example, a “Choose Life” plate without providing a pro-
choice alternative would constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimi-
nation.  These cases have split the circuits, producing three separate
approaches to the issue.122  But two circuits have employed the rea-
sonable-observer test to determine that specialty license plates are best
construed as private speech.123  Thus, those courts required viewpoint
neutrality.124
But a rational-observer test has several drawbacks.  It invites inten-
sively fact-based decisions about what a “reasonable observer” would
believe in a given situation.  Such determinations add little predict-
ability to the law, as each new case could be distinguished on its partic-
ular facts.  Furthermore, the test loses its clarity in the state-action
120 Id. at 271.  The Court explicitly placed school-sponsored publications and theatri-
cal productions in the category of school-sponsored speech but failed to provide any crite-
ria for determining what other activities might be “reasonably perceive[d] to bear the
imprimatur of the school.” Id.  It is unclear to what extent other activities (e.g.,
after-school programs, athletic practice, sports games, musical performances, speech and
debate meets, etc.) might be classified as school-sponsored speech.
121 For a survey of the specialty-license-plate cases, see Corbin, supra note 75, at R
619–23.
122 The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that specialty license plates are
private speech. See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2009); Choose Life
Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 865 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009); Ariz.
Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 960, 973 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 56
(2008).  The Sixth Circuit has held that specialty plates constitute government speech and
thus allowed a “Choose Life” plate. See ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 371–72
(6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 906 (2006).  The Fourth Circuit has held that specialty
license plates are a hybrid of government and private speech but determined that, because
the private element substantially predominated, the plates must be content neutral. See
Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 795 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 1119 (2005).
123 See Roach, 560 F.3d at 867 (“[A] reasonable and fully informed observer would con-
sider the speaker to be the organization that sponsors and the vehicle owner who displays
the specialty license plate.”); Choose Life Ill., 457 F.3d at 863 (“Under all the circumstances,
would a reasonable person consider the speaker to be the government or a private
party?”).
124 See Roach, 560 F.3d at 870; Choose Life Ill., 457 F.3d at 855–56.
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context.  Applied to the state-action doctrine, the rational-observer
standard would only impose constitutional limitations on private ac-
tors when a rational observer would consider a private act to be the act
of the state.  This would be similar to an examination of whether the
private actor has apparent authority.125  While this may be effective for
determining when a private actor has assumed a government func-
tion,126 it would be woefully inadequate for dealing with cases in
which the government has given considerable—though not patent—
aid or support to a private actor.  Indeed, in such cases it should not
matter how much the private actor looks like a state actor, but to what
extent the state has empowered the private actor’s acts.
B. Government Intent
Hazelwood was not the first case to touch upon
government-speech issues in the context of public schools.  In Board of
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,127 the
Court enunciated an intent-based standard that is foreign to the cur-
rent government-speech regime.128  In Island Trees, the school board
removed several books that were deemed “irrelevant, vulgar, immoral,
and in bad taste” from the school library and curriculum.129  Justice
William Brennan, writing the Court’s plurality opinion, focused upon
the students’ rights to access information, holding that the school
board could exercise its discretion to determine the content of the
school library based only on a book’s “educational suitability,” not on
125 The Court has employed an apparent-authority approach in cases where private
individuals act under color of law. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951)
(affirming the conviction of a private detective for violating federal rights under color of
law).
126 For example, Justice Rehnquist’s requirement that an exercise of power be tradi-
tionally exclusively reserved to the state to be considered state action would exclude such
fundamental public functions as firefighting and even police, whereas a rational-observer
standard would likely include such public functions.
127 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
128 See id. at 871.
129 See id. at 859.
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the board’s desire to suppress disfavored content or ideas.130  For the
Court, this was a question of intent.131
Whereas the plurality opinion focused upon the intent of the
school board, Chief Justice Warren Burger’s dissenting opinion more
clearly presages the modern government-speech doctrine.  Chief Jus-
tice Burger rejected the plurality’s reliance upon the students’ right to
access information, instead asserting the power of the school to craft
its own curriculum.132  He saw this power as essential to the school’s
role as an inculcator of fundamental values.133  Rather than constru-
ing the school board’s action as a restriction of speech, he saw it as a
proper exercise of the board’s authority to determine the content of
its curriculum.134  This language anticipates Justice Souter’s explana-
tion of government speech in Johanns: just as the government must
express one view at the exclusion of another in order to govern, so
must the school make content-based decisions in order to teach.135
Thus, Chief Justice Burger recognized that any determination of the
educational suitability of a book is not easily divorced from an exami-
nation—and implicit approval or disapproval—of the book’s mes-
sage.136  Under Chief Justice Burger’s analysis, it is not the First
Amendment that restrains the school board’s curricular choices but
the democratic process.  Rather than assign the policing of the curric-
ulum to the federal courts, he would leave that role to the people,
who can vote to replace school-board members with whom they disa-
130 See id. at 870–71, 873.  Clearly, the school cannot be expected to include all books
in its curriculum or its library.  Thus, the school must choose among books to be included
and books not to be included (i.e., to be excluded).  Such decisions necessarily entail an
adjudication of a book’s content and suitability for the educational context. Id.  Thus, the
Court does not hold that the school board must make content-neutral decisions regarding
which books to include—such a requirement would undermine the school’s ability to craft
its curriculum and make educational decisions. Id.  Rather, the Court forbids the school
board from intentionally suppressing disfavored viewpoints by making certain books un-
available.  Thus, the Court recognizes that this is not a standard restriction on pure speech
(which may be subjected only to content-neutral “time, place, or manner” restrictions, see
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)), but it does not go so
far as to recognize the school board’s choices as government speech.
131 See Island Trees, 457 U.S. at 871 (“If [the school board] intended by their removal
decision to deny respondents access to ideas with which [the board] disagreed, and if this
intent was the decisive factor in [the board’s] decision, then [the board has] exercised [its]
discretion in violation of the Constitution.” (footnote omitted)).
132 See id. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 Compare id., with Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting).
136 See Island Trees, 457 U.S. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Presumably all activity
within a primary or secondary school involves the conveyance of information and at least
an implied approval of the worth of that information.  How are ‘fundamental values’ to be
inculcated except by having school boards make content-based decisions about the appro-
priateness of retaining materials in the school library and curriculum.”).
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gree.137  But Chief Justice’s Burger’s view that the school board’s deci-
sion to remove the books was a form of government action or speech
that is not subject to the constraints of the First Amendment did not
prevail.  The plurality instead held that such an act is a violation of the
First Amendment if by it the school board intended to suppress a disfa-
vored view point.138
Although analysis of government intent did not make its way out
of the school context and into the modern government-speech doc-
trine, examining the government’s intent may be an effective method
of adjudicating some forms of government speech.  For example, an
intent-based analysis could have been applied in Pleasant Grove: if the
city’s policy were intended to suppress a disfavored viewpoint rather
than to limit the park to monuments that are relevant to the city’s
history or donated by groups with a longstanding connection with the
city, it would not be permissible.  But this approach is less appropriate
in the state-action context.  Indeed, some state-action cases involve de
minimis government contacts, meaning that the government’s intent is
irrelevant.  For example, an examination of the government’s intent
in a case like Marsh—a case devoid of any actual state action—would
be futile.  Furthermore, proving the government’s intent when it is
comprised of various actors working in multifarious capacities can
prove a daunting hurdle.
C. Government Function
The government-function test has long been a part of the
state-action doctrine.  As discussed in Part I.A, the standard’s current
articulation—applying only to those “powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State”139—has significantly limited its scope.  But a
government-function test along the lines of that articulated in Evans
may prove an effective standard for both state action and government
speech.  In the context of state action, the doctrine was once an effec-
tive tool for ensuring that public rights could not be infringed by pri-
vate actors who had assumed a government function.  In the realm of
government speech, a government-function approach would allow the
government to control private speech that is governmental in na-
ture—for example, the erection of permanent monuments on govern-
ment land.  At the same time, speech with no apparent governmental
137 See id.  This rationale also anticipates Justice Souter’s justification for his
rational-observer test in Johanns and Pleasant Grove. See, e.g., Johanns, 544 U.S. at 578–79
(Souter, J., dissenting).
138 Island Trees, 457 U.S. at 871.
139 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
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nexus—such as an advertising campaign that does not publicize its
governmental origins—would not constitute government speech.140
But the government-function standard is not comprehensive
enough to account for all of the various types of state-action cases.
When the Court applies the government-function test, it imputes gov-
ernment action to private individuals when no actual government ac-
tion has taken place.  Although the government-function test is
perfectly suited for those situations, they are not the only circum-
stances to which the state-action doctrine has been applied.  For ex-
ample, state-aid cases such as Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority141
would not satisfy the government-function test because rather than a
private individual entangling itself in matters governmental in nature,
the government has involved itself in the private sphere in these
cases.142
Furthermore, the government-function test has proved an un-
workable standard in other contexts.  In National League of Cities v.
Usery,143 the Court held that the Tenth Amendment barred Congress
from regulating the wages, hours, and benefits of State employees be-
cause the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to “directly
displace the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions.”144  To do so would impermissi-
bly regulate “the States as States.”145  Thus, Justice Rehnquist im-
ported the traditional government-function standard—similar to that
which he had articulated two years prior in Jackson—into the Tenth
Amendment context.146
But because the Court did not articulate a clear test for determin-
ing which functions are traditional governmental functions, the gov-
ernment-function standard proved unworkable, producing a
140 As applied here, the test clearly mirrors Justice Souter’s concurrence in Pleasant
Grove and dissent in Johanns. See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481
(2009) (Souter, J., concurring); Johanns, 544 U.S. at 570.  Indeed, an attribution-based stan-
dard such as Justice Souter’s is closely related to an inquiry into the speech’s function:
speech that serves a government function will almost certainly be readily attributable by a
reasonable observer to the government.
141 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
142 In Burton, the Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to a private restaurant
that leased property owned by the Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the State of
Delaware. See id. at 716–17.  Whereas operating a municipal parking garage is a public
function, leasing property to private restaurants is probably not; furthermore, there were
no apparent signs that the government was involved with the private enterprise.
143 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
144 Id. at 852.
145 Id. at 845.
146 See id. at 842, 852 (finding that the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from
enacting legislation that displaced the “[s]tates’ freedom to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions”).
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patchwork of protected and unprotected functions in the lower
courts.  In the decade following National League of Cities, courts held
that licensing automobile drivers,147 operating a municipal airport,148
performing solid waste disposal,149 regulating ambulance services,150
and operating a highway authority151 are traditional governmental
functions protected under National League of Cities.  At the same time,
courts held that operation of a telephone system,152 regulation of traf-
fic on public roads,153 leasing and sale of natural gas,154 issuance of
industrial development bonds,155 regulation of intrastate natural-gas
sales,156 regulation of air transportation,157 operation of a
mental-health facility,158 and provision of in-house domestic services
for the aged and handicapped159 are not entitled to immunity and
thus are subject to congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause.
With the lack of guidance creating inconsistent and unpredict-
able rulings in the lower courts, the Court took up the issue again in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.160  Recognizing the
impossibility of determining which functions are properly “traditional
governmental functions,” the Court overruled National League of Cities:
“There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of de-
marcation between essential and non-essential governmental func-
tions.  Many governmental functions of today have at some time in
the past been non-governmental.  The genius of our government
provides that, within the sphere of constitutional action, the peo-
ple—acting not through the courts but through their elected legis-
lative representatives—have the power to determine as conditions
demand, what services and functions the public welfare requires.”
147 See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 1978).
148 See Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037–38 (6th Cir. 1979).
149 See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1196 (6th Cir. 1981), va-
cated, 455 U.S. 931 (1982).
150 See Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kan. City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967–69 (W.D. Mo.
1982).
151 See Molina-Estrada v. P.R. Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845–46 (1st Cir. 1982).
152 See P.R. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F.2d 694, 700–01 (1st Cir. 1977).
153 See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
154 See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C. v. FERC, 587 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1979).
155 See Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, Kan., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270,
1296–97 (D. Kan. 1980).
156 See Oklahoma ex. rel. Derryberry v. FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (W.D. Okla. 1980),
aff’d, 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981).
157 See Hughes Air Corp. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 644 F.2d 1334, 1340–41 (9th
Cir. 1981).
158 See Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 669 F.2d 671, 680–81 (11th Cir.
1982).
159 See Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1983).
160 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unwork-
able in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation
that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular govern-
mental function is “integral” or “traditional.”  Any such rule leads to
inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of
democratic self-governance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely
because it is divorced from those principles.161
Thus, although the government-function standard has not yet
been rejected in the state-action context, its support is eroding.  In-
deed, the inconsistency and unpredictability with which the test was
applied in the Tenth Amendment context counsels strongly against its
application in other areas of the law.
CONCLUSION
The contraction of the state-action doctrine and the expansion of
government speech have together narrowed the spectrum of private,
protected speech.  On one end of the spectrum, the state-action doc-
trine has imputed less private conduct to the government, resulting in
less constitutional protection.  On the other end of the spectrum, the
government-speech doctrine has imputed more private speech to the
government, resulting again in less constitutional protection.  The
paradox inherent in the application of these two doctrines makes a
search for a consistent standard particularly difficult—despite the fact
that the two doctrines are closely related because government speech
is a form of state action.
Notwithstanding this close relationship, the two doctrines address
very different types of problems: the state-action doctrine protects in-
dividuals from constitutional violations perpetrated by other private
individuals, and the government-speech doctrine protects the govern-
ment from claims of First Amendment violations.  Furthermore, the
two doctrines are premised upon the public/private distinction, yet
they almost always involve cases where government action and private
action are entwined or difficult to distinguish.  Such cases resist for-
malist classifications.  The root of this problem may lie at the very
foundation of the state-action doctrine.  By limiting the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment to state action—despite contrary congres-
sional intent—the Civil Rights Cases set the stage for the current
dilemma.
Now, the variety of circumstances in which courts may be called
upon to distinguish between government and private action will likely
render any formal test suboptimal in many circumstances.  Indeed,
the three attempts at a consistent standard examined above are all
161 Id. at 546–47 (citation omitted) (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427
(1938) (Black, J., concurring)).
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deeply flawed and perhaps unfit for the task.  But the alternative—a
multifactor, context-sensitive approach—is exactly what gives courts
the freedom to expand or contract the domain of the government
relative to the domain of private actors in a results-oriented fashion.
Accordingly, a uniform, formal test, even if predictably over- and un-
derinclusive, may be preferable to the existing open-ended approach
to drawing the line between private and public.
So long as the Court maintains the formalist distinction between
the public and private spheres in the First Amendment arena without
a clear test to distinguish them, courts will continue to be able to use
the state-action and government-speech doctrines to narrow the spec-
trum of private, protected speech.
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